

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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INR-07 CIAE-00 /057 W

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R 031721Z OCT 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2359

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL MBFR VIENNA 0473

FOR NEWHOUSE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF WESTERN
POSITION ON POST REDUCTION MANPOWER LIMITATIONS

REF: STATE 233733

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSION AT THE LONDON TRILATERAL,
WE SUBMIT FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THE TRILATERAL CONTEXT A
POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF HOW TO GAIN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE
BOTH OF COLLECTIVE POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS FOR THE MILITARY
MANPOWER OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AND OF A SPECIFIC LIMITA-
TION ON THE SOVIETS.

2. THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE WESTERN POSITION
ON COLLECTIVITY IS THAT THE USSR CANNOT AGREE TO LIMIT ITS
MANPOWER UNDER A SPECIFIC CEILING IN A CONTEXT IN WHICH THE
BUNDESWEHR IS NOT ALSO SO INDIVIDUALLY LIMITED. BUT A NATIONAL

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CEILING ON FRG MANPOWER IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST, WHILE A
SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON SOVIET MANPOWER DEPLOYED IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS IS ESSENTIAL TO A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT.

3. WE SUGGEST FOR CONSIDERATION TOGETHER WITH OTHER POSSIBILI-
TIES ON APPROACH ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) AS UNDER THE PRESENT NATO POSITION, US AND SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC LIMITS AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS AFTER PHASE I AND II REDUCTIONS;

(B) THE OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING.

(C) BUT AN AGREEMENT COULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT THE LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER COULD BE INCREASED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

(1) IF ONE OR MORE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EITHER SIDE SHOULD INCREASE THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MANPOWER OF ITS SIDE AT THE AGREED COMMON CEILING LEVEL AFTER DECREASES IN THE MANPOWER OF THAT SIDE HAVE TAKEN PLACE,

(2) THEN THE US OR USSR COULD, IF IT DESIRED, INCREASE ITS MILITARY MANPOWER BY AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO SUCH INCREASE IF MADE BY A SINGLE PARTICIPANT ON THE OTHER SIDE, OR TO THE LARGEST INCREASE BY ANY PARTICIPANT ON THE OTHER SIDE IF TWO OR MORE PARTICIPANTS JOIN IN THE INCREASE,

(3) SUCH AN INCREASE IN US OR SOVIET MANPOWER LEVELS WOULD REQUIRE AN EQUAL OFFSETTING DECREASE IN THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE OTHER STATES ON
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ITS SIDE, SO THAT THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED.

4. AN EXAMPLE WILL CLARIFY THE PROPOSAL:

(A) AFTER A COMMON CEILING IS IN EFFECT, NETHERLANDS FORCES ARE UNILATERALLY REDUCED BY 10,000 MEN;

(B) THE FRG INCREASES BY 8,000 AND THE UK BY 2,000 TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS REDUCTION;

(C) THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES BY 8,000 MEN IF NSWP FORCES ARE REDUCED BY A LIKE AMOUNT.

5. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, SOVIET FORCES COULD BE INCREASED ONLY IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN ACTIONS. THE INCREASE IS OPTIONAL, NOT REQUIRED. THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES COULD NOT INITIATE THE SUBSTITUTION OF SOVIET FOR NSWP FORCES, ALTHOUGH IN THEORY THEY COULD INITIATE INTERNAL CHANGES AMONG NON-

SOVIET WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE US TO INCREASE IF IT DESIRED.

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6. THE PROPOSAL COULD ALSO SPECIFY A THRESHOLD UNDER WHICH LIMITED INCREASES IN MANPOWER UP TO A CERTAIN SPECIFIED LEVEL BY NON-US NATO AND NSWP DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT OPEN THE WAY TO INCREASES IN US AND SOVIET MANPOWER LEVELS. HOWEVER SUCH A THRESHOLD IS NOT A NECESSARY PART OF THIS PROPOSAL.

7. THIS APPROACH WOULD PROTECT THE WEST BY PROVIDING A MENAINGFUL LIMIT ON SOVIET FORCES WHILE ALSO BEING MORE NEGOTIABLE BY PROVIDING THE SOVIET WITH SOME MEANS OF REDRESS IN THE EVENT OF BUNDESWEHR INCREASES. NATURALLY, THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD NOT BE SINGLED OUT BY NAME.

8. THE DRAWBACK OF THE APPROACH IS THAT INCREASES BY ANY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT COULD RESULT IN SOVIET INCREASES, ALTHOUGH AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER WARSAW PACT FORCES. THIS FACT MIGHT ENCOURAGE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF THEIR MANPOWER. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF DESPITE THIS ENCOURAGEMENT TO MAINTAIN EXISTING MANPOWER LEVELS, A WESTERN COUNTRY REDUCES, THERE MAY BE RELUCTANCE TO MAKE COMPENSATING INCREASES WHICH COULD TRIGGER SOVIET INCREASES.

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9. A FURTHER POTENTIAL DRAWBACK IN THIS APPROACH AS WITH OTHERS IS THAT IT COULD RESULT IN FRENCH OBJECTIONS; IN THIS CASE, FIRST, AND LESS SERIOUSLY BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL IN PARA 3(1) REFERS INDIRECTLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH DECREASES BY REFERRING TO "DECREASES IN THE MANPOWER OF THAT SIDE". SECOND, THE FRENCH MIGHT OBJECT THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE ADDED PRESSURES ON THE FRENCH NOT TO DECREASE BECAUSE ANY FRENCH DECREASE WOULD EITHER LEAD TO SOVIET INCREASES OR A SHORTFALL IN THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING.

10. THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASINGLY TRIED TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE THAT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET FORCES MUST BE IDENTICAL TO THOSE APPLIED TO FRG FORCES. THUS, THE EAST MIGHT CRITICIZE THE APPROACH DESCRIBED ABOVE AS INEQUITABLE SINCE IT WOULD PERMIT SOVIET INCREASES ONLY IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN ACTIONS WHILE THE FRG COULD INCREASE ITS FORCES WITHOUT REQUIRING AN INITIATING ACTION ON THE PART OF THE EAST. IT WOULD SEEM POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH SUCH OBJECTIVES BY RESPONSES ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. THE USSR IS BEING TREATED IN PRECISELY THE SAME MANNER AS THE US;

B. THE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET FORCES WOULD APPLY SOLELY TO USSR FORCES IN THE AREA, THUS ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE SAME LIMITATIONS TO THE FRG WOULD BE UNFAIR AS VIRTUALLY ALL FRG FORCES ARE LOCATED IN THE AREA; AND

C. AS A RESULT OF THE MECHANISM WHEREBY THE SOVIETS COULD COMPENSATE FOR, IN EFFECT, FRG FORCES INCREASES, THERE WOULD BE A MAJOR INHIBITION ACTING TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT ALTERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF WESTERN FORCES UNDER
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THE COMMON CEILING. RESOR

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